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PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION IS A TOPIC OF INTEREST both academically and in a policy arena. Left solely to private decision makers, a public 
good is provided at a less than optimal level. The 
clear policy solution is government provision of 
the good. However, even in the case of govern-
ment provision, an individual may still choose to 
provide public goods, either due to the extent to 
which the benefi ts from the good are captured by 
the individual, or to a “warm glow” received from 
contributing. Thus, when policy makers choose 
provision levels, they must account for the level of 
private provision; otherwise the public good may in 
fact be oversupplied relative to the optimal level.
The interaction between public and private 
sources of contributions to public goods is of spe-
cial importance to environmental policy. Numerous 
environmental public goods, including clean air 
and reserved open space, are provided by both pub-
lic and private funding. Cap-and-trade policies, in 
which the government mandates a fi xed maximum 
industry-wide level of emissions and allows fi rms 
to trade permits to achieve the goal, exemplify this. 
Permits may be purchased by anyone, not merely 
potential emitters, and many environmental groups 
are actively involved in purchasing and retiring per-
mits to reduce the total amount of pollutants.1 Park-
land can be provided publicly, such as with national 
or state parks, or through private organizations. 
There is currently much emphasis on expanding 
public-private partnerships in helping the environ-
ment. Massachusetts in 2003 created the Offi ce of 
Public Private Partnerships within the Executive 
Offi ce of Environmental Affairs to coordinate such 
efforts. The Bush Administration has long favored 
a voluntary approach to environmental regulation, 
where governments and private fi rms collaborate 
on achieving environmental goals.
The issue of private or voluntary provision of 
public goods is vital to the policy issue of climate 
change. The climate is not merely a public good; it 
is a global public good. To the extent that emissions 
mitigation must be implemented by nations, it must 
be provided voluntary by these nations, given that 
no super-national authority can mandate emissions 
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reductions from individual nations. Designing 
appropriate policies and incentives to achieve 
optimal provision of this global public good is a 
central area of applied research.2
A literature that examines this interaction 
between public and private funding of public goods 
deals with the specifi c question of how public funds 
crowd out or crowd in private funds. Many papers 
use data from nonprofi t organizations to address 
this issue. Most of these studies focus on a single 
type of charity, usually social service charities. 
This group of charities includes those that address 
problems of hunger, homelessness, housing, crime, 
and other social problems. Other papers focus on 
arts organizations. No papers address the issue of 
crowding in or crowding out by looking specifi cally 
at environmental charities. In this paper, I extend 
a chapter of my dissertation and compare results 
from a model of the crowding in and crowding 
out of public and private contributions to chari-
ties, using data from both social service charities 
and environmental charities. The results from the 
two sets of charities are quite different. The data 
from social service charities are consistent with 
the model: government grants to charities crowd 
in private donations due to a signaling effect, and 
private donations crowd out government grants. 
For environmental charities, these predicted results 
are not found with signifi cance. Because the results 
from the two sets of charities, providing different 
types of public goods, are so different, they urge 
caution in applying the results from a particular 
type of charity or public good to a broader class.
In the next section, I briefl y summarize the 
model I use to make the predictions described 
previously, and I introduce some related literature. I 
then describe the data used, followed by the results. 
I end with a conclusion interpreting the differences 
between the two sets of charities.
CROWDING OUT AND CROWDING IN OF PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS
When government contributes to provide public 
goods, individuals may offset changes in govern-
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ment contributions, if individuals care only about 
the total level of provision of the public good. 
The earliest papers on the crowding out of private 
donations by government grants, in fact, show that 
in this case crowding out is perfectly one-for-one, 
so that the total level of provision is unaffected by 
the government’s chosen level. This is the result 
reached in both Warr (1982) and Roberts (1984). 
However, empirical evidence has often found that 
where there is crowding out of government grants, 
it is less than one-for-one. Kingma (1989) fi nds 
only partial crowding out of donations for public 
radio stations. A common explanation for this result 
is provided in Andreoni (1989), who suggests 
that individuals receive utility both from the total 
amount of the public good and the amount that 
is donated by that particular individual: a “warm 
glow” effect. With this effect, private and public 
contributions to the public good are no longer 
perfect substitutes, so the one-for-one crowding 
out is no longer present.
Though many studies find crowding out of 
private donations, some find crowding in: an 
increase in government grants to a charity leads 
to an increase in private donations to that charity. 
This is found in Khanna and Sandler (2000) for 
charities in the United Kingdom and Payne (2001) 
for academic research institutions. A number of 
different explanations for this phenomenon are 
provided in Rose-Ackerman (1986). The explana-
tion that I focus on here is one of signaling: the 
government grants provide information to potential 
donors about the quality of the charity. Signaling in 
charitable contributions is also studied by Andreoni 
(1998), who develops a model of seed money from 
large private donors resolving uncertainty about the 
quality of a public good, and in List and Lucking-
Reiley (2002), who conduct a fi eld experiment and 
fi nd evidence for the crowding in of seed money.
In Heutel (2007), I make two contributions to 
this literature, which I summarize here. Details 
are available in that paper. First, while the lit-
erature focuses on how government grants affect 
private donations, I examine causality in the other 
directions. If government grants can crowd out 
private donations, can private donations crowd 
out government grants? By simply extending 
the standard model of crowding out by allow-
ing the government’s level of contribution to be 
endogenous, the best response functions for both 
individuals and the government do indeed show 
that crowding out is possible in either direction. 
Second, I add uncertainty to the standard crowding 
out model and allow for government grants to act 
as a signal of that uncertainty. In this case, gov-
ernment grants can cause crowding in, if a higher 
level of grants signals a higher quality of the public 
good. As potential donors observe higher levels of 
grants to a charity, they update their beliefs about 
the quality of that charity and adjust their level of 
donations accordingly. 
DATA ON SOCIAL SERVICE AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHARITIES
Data were obtained from the National Center on 
Charitable Statistics, at the Urban Institute.3 Data 
are collected from the IRS Form 990s that must be 
submitted by all 501(c)(3) nonprofi t organizations 
that have at least $25,000 in gross receipts annu-
ally, though religious organizations are excepted. 
The data are from fi scal years 1998-2003 and they 
include 1,388,480 total observations in an unbal-
anced panel. Organizations are classifi ed accord-
ing to the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities 
(NTEE), which divides organizations into 26 major 
groups. I focus on charities classifi ed into major 
groups C and D, representing “Environment” and 
“Animal-Related,” respectively. Environmental 
charities are defi ned as those groups whose primary 
purpose is to preserve, protect, and improve the 
environment. Animal-related charities are defi ned 
as private nonprofi t organizations whose primary 
purpose is to provide for the care, protection, and 
control of wildlife and domestic animals that are 
a part of the living environment; to help people 
develop an understanding of their pets; and to 
train animals for purposes of showing.4 Hereafter, 
I refer to all of these charities as environmental 
organizations. I compare the results based on data 
from environmental organizations to results based 
on a set of other types of social service organiza-
tions. This set includes organizations that focus 
on the following: crime, employment, food and 
nutrition, housing, human services, and community 
improvement.5 This set of organizations, hereafter 
referred to as social service organizations, provides 
a basis to see how the environmental organiza-
tions differ. 
The differences in charities’ revenue sources 
can be seen in Figure 1, which divides up the 
average source of funding for each type of charity 
into several categories.6 The revenue sources for 
the two types of charities are dramatically differ-
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Notes: Environmental charities include those in NTEE codes C (Environment) and D (Animal-related). Social 
service charities include those in NTEE codes I (Crime and Legal-related), J (Employment), K (Food, Agriculture, 
and Nutrition), L (Housing and Shelter), P (Human Services), and S (Community Improvement and Capacity 
Building). Investment income includes interest and dividends; rents and sales includes securities and inventory; 
other includes special events’ revenues. 
Figure 1
Sources of Revenue, Environmental Charities
Direct Public Support
50%
Indirect Public Support
2%
Government Grants
11%
ProgramService
Revenue 21%
Dues 4%
Investment Income 4%
Rents and Sales 5%
Other 3%
Sources of Revenue, Social Service Charities
Direct Public Support
14%
Indirect Public Support
3%
Government Grants
26%ProgramService
Revenue
49%
Investment Income
2%
Dues
2%
Other
2%
Rents and Sales
2%
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ent. Environmental charities receive half of their 
revenue from direct public support, including 
individual donations, while social service charities 
receive only 14 percent from this source. Govern-
ment grants constitute a much smaller share of 
environmental charities’ revenues (11 percent) than 
of social service charities’ revenues (26 percent). 
Social service charities get about half of their 
revenue from program services; environmental 
charities receive only one-fi fth of their revenues 
from this source. The remaining sources of rev-
enues are small for both types of charities, though 
environmental charities receive more in each of 
the remaining categories.
Table 1 presents revenues aggregated into four 
main categories. As a measure of private dona-
tions, I combine direct public support, indirect 
public support, and dues. Government grants and 
program service revenue have their own catego-
ries, and the remaining revenues are classifi ed as 
“other.” The top panel of Table 1 lists statistics 
for environmental organizations, the bottom panel 
for social service organizations. The number of 
environmental organizations is about one-fi fteenth 
the number of social service organizations. On 
average, environmental organizations receive less 
total revenue than social service organizations 
($1,281,000 vs. $1,975,000). Of this revenue, 
though, they receive a great deal more from private 
donations, and less from government grants and 
program service revenue. Finally, the mean values 
are all much higher than the median values, and 
even the 75th percentile values, suggesting a data 
set that is skewed towards high-revenue fi rms. 
These statistics suggest that the revenue sources 
for environmental charities are quite different than 
those of social service charities. 
Trends in these values are presented in Figure 
2. The top panel is for environmental charities; the 
bottom panel for social service charities. The values 
presented are the average per charity value of gov-
ernment grants and private donations in constant 
2002 dollars. Just as shown in Table 1 for 2002 
only, environmental charities receive more from 
private donations than from government grants, 
while social service charities receive more from 
government grants in all years. 
The presence of crowding out in either direction 
implies that spikes in government grants would be 
accompanied by dips in private donations, and vice 
versa. For social service charities, no such pattern 
emerges, since both values appear to be increas-
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Notes: Environmental and Social Service charities are defi ned as in Figure 1. All dollar values are defl ated by CPI. 
Figure 2
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ing. However, environmental charities exhibit this 
pattern. After 2001, a dip in private donations is 
accompanied by an increase in government grants.7 
This is merely suggestive, so I turn to regression 
analysis to identify the presence of a crowding 
out effect.
RESULTS
I test for crowding out or crowding in of either 
government grants or private donations. This 
entails two regression equations; one where gov-
ernment grants is the dependent variable and one 
where private donations is the dependent variable. 
Analysis is done at the charity-year level in a fi xed-
effects framework. A number of control variables 
are included in both regressions. At the charity 
level, I include the amounts of program service 
revenue and all other revenue. At the county-year 
level, I include the unemployment rate, average 
household income, and total population, while at 
the state-year level I include the fraction of the 
population 65 or older, the fraction of a state’s 
U.S. Congress and Senate delegations that are 
Democrats, and a dummy for whether the state 
governor is a Democrat.
A set of instruments is required for the level of 
government grants and another one for the level of 
private donations. I look to the literature for instru-
ments for the level of government grants, since this 
direction of causality has been examined before. 
The instruments I use are state-year level measures 
of government transfers to individuals from Sup-
plemental Security Income (SSI) programs.8 This 
is a measure of the “generosity” of the government 
in a particular year, or the availability of funds for 
charitable activity. An additional instrument is the 
average level of government grants to charities in 
a state-year.
I use two instruments at the state-year level for 
private donations. First is the price of a dollar of 
a charitable donation based on state and federal 
income tax rates and rules for allowing deduc-
tions of charitable contributions. This informa-
tion is available from NBER’s Taxsim program.9 
Although a large literature fi nds that tax incentives 
do have signifi cant impacts on individual-level 
charitable contributions, in this case this instru-
ment has very low predictive power. This is 
because the tax rate used is a statewide average, 
and signifi cant heterogeneity in marginal tax rates 
and itemization exists within states. Furthermore, 
a charity may receive donations from individuals 
located in other states, so the tax incentives in the 
charity’s home state do not necessarily apply to 
that charity’s donors. 
In addition to this weak instrument, I add a state-
year level measure of disposable income, generated 
from the ratio of state-level average home prices, 
as measured by the Freddie Mac Conventional 
Mortgage Home Price Index, to the county-level 
per capita income. This ratio represents the frac-
tion of the average consumer’s income devoted 
to a large nondiscretionary expense and therefore 
unavailable for discretionary spending including 
charitable contributions.
Regression results appear in Table 2. The fi rst 
two columns are from social service charities 
(replicating the results from Heutel (2007)), and the 
last two columns are from environmental charities. 
In columns one and three, the dependent variable 
is private donations and the endogenous regressor 
is government grants; in columns two and four 
those are reversed. The results from social service 
charities are consistent with the theories described 
previously. There is evidence that government 
grants crowd in private donations, as would be 
expected if government grants are signaling charity 
quality. The level of crowding in is about 60 cents 
per dollar. There is also evidence of government 
grants responding to private donations; in this 
direction the effect is one of crowding out. The 
magnitude of the crowding out effect in this direc-
tion is very large: greater than one-for-one. This 
may be due to endogeneity bias from instrument 
choice; Heutel (2007) shows that this result is not 
very robust to other specifi cations and alternative 
instrument choices. In columns three and four, the 
results for environmental charities are quite differ-
ent. The sign of each coeffi cient is opposite that of 
its corresponding coeffi cient in the social service 
charities’ regressions, but neither is signifi cantly 
different from zero.
As described in Heutel (2007), though omit-
ted here, the results from column one showing 
government grants crowding in private donations 
for social service charities are robust to a number 
of specifi cations, including regressing on lagged 
values of government grants, estimating simul-
taneously with 3SLS, weak instrument tests, and 
estimating by LIML instead of least squares. In 
none of these robustness checks is a signifi cant 
coeffi cient found on the variables of interest in the 
equations for environmental charities.
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Table 2
Regression Results
Endogenous Regressor 
(Government Grants or 
Private Donations)
Program Service Revenue
Other Revenue
Population
Income
Unemployment Rate, 
Percent
Percent Population > 65
Number Dem Senators
Percent Congress 
members Dem
Indicator for Democratic 
governor
F-test on signifi cance of 
instruments in fi rst stage 
regression (p-value)
Overidentifi cation Sargan 
test statistic (p-value)
Number of Observations
Number of Charities
(1)
Dependent Variable 
= Private Donations
.582**
(.226)
.131*
(.0614)
-.0160
(.0146)
.00330
(.00442)
-1.48
(1.03)
1480
(1770)
-17000**
(6110)
2710
(4540)
4550
(21000)
-8140
(5980)
6.58
(.000)
4.83
(.0893)
175234
 29206
(2)
Dependent Variable 
= Government Grants
-2.43*
(1.16)
-.323**
(.0413)
-.0794
(.0457)
.0169
(.0115)
-2.17
(1.98)
-1270
(3710)
-42900*
(20900)
8820
(9900)
62800
(47900)
3770
(11100)
2.66
(.0700)
0.000
(.9861)
175234
 29206
Social Service Charities
(3)
Dependent Variable 
= Private Donations
-.0744
(.199)
.120
(.0893)
-.0226
(.0427)
.00115
(.00357)
1.93
(6.11)
-8910
(11900)
-35500*
(15900)
-26200
(16700)
1170
(70500)
16000
(19500)
1.77
(.1512)
0.630
(.730)
16602
 2767
(4)
Dependent Variable 
= Government Grants
.135
(.503)
-.0965
(.0554)
-.0215
(.0209)
.00429
(.00275)
-10.6*
(4.70)
-18300*
(8610)
18200
(20000)
3250
(15200)
-18000
(46300)
-2460
(12500)
0.31
(.576)
.895
(.344)
16602
2767
Environmental Charities
Notes: Data are from 1998-2003 and only include those organizations that are in the panel for all six years and whose 
reported categorical revenues sum up to reported total revenues, and likewise for expenses. Instruments for government 
grants are the state-year average value of grants to charities, the state-year total payments paid to individuals through 
SSI, and the state-year payments paid to individuals through SSI for the aged. Instruments for private donations are the 
calculated private cost of donations, based upon the state plus federal income tax rate and whether states allow charitable 
deductions, and the ratio of a state’s home price index to a county’s per capita income.
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As an additional test for environmental chari-
ties, I select a particular category of charity and 
use instruments specifi c to that category to attempt 
to better identify the effect of private donations 
on government grants. The fi rst instrument is the 
number of species listed as threatened or endan-
gered under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 
in a state-year. Listing a species is an early step in 
the process under the ESA. By listing a species, 
it becomes illegal to hunt or otherwise harm that 
species, but no governmental action is taken until 
possibly a critical habitat for the species is chosen. 
As of 1998, only 40 percent of listed species had 
designated critical habitat. Therefore, listing a spe-
cies is expected to have no direct effect on govern-
ment grants to charities that deal with endangered 
species. However, having a new species listed 
nearby is likely to promote individuals to donate to 
charities that deal with that issue. Since the ESA is 
widely reported in the media, individuals are likely 
to be aware of the new listings.10 The instruments 
used are a count of the number of species listed 
as either endangered or threatened in each state 
in each year.
The NTEE classifi cation system category “D31” 
covers charities that deal with “Protection of 
Endangered Species.” Because only a few of these 
charities (14) appear in the data set in all six years, 
I also include charities from category “D30”: Wild-
life Preservation and Protection. These charities 
are also likely to be impacted by announcements 
of the listing of endangered species. The results 
from these regressions, not presented here, are 
again insignifi cant. Though the new instrument is 
expected to identify the effect of private donations 
on government grants, none of the coeffi cients on 
that variable are signifi cant. This may partly be 
due to the fact that so few charities fall into this 
category, especially in the columns that exclude 
the broader “D30” designation. 
I next use a different instrument for private dona-
tions that applies to a different set of charities. The 
Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) is an EPA-spon-
sored program that publicly releases information 
on toxic chemicals emitted by individual plants. 
Businesses and government agencies self-report 
emissions, which are available on the EPA Web site. 
The reported level of emissions does not relate to 
any regulatory power; they are reported simply to 
inform the public and allow individuals to make 
more informed decisions about how pollution 
impacts their health. Because of this, reported TRI 
emissions are likely to impact private donations to 
charities that deal with industrial pollution but are 
unlikely to affect government behavior directly. 
The NTEE category “C20” covers charities dedi-
cated to “Pollution Abatement and Control.” The 
regression results from this set of charities using 
this instrument also fails to fi nd any evidence of 
the hypothesized effect of private donations on 
government grants.
DISCUSSION
This paper uses data from various types of public 
goods, but the results are important to environmental 
issues in particular. Both the regressions and the 
summary statistics show that, compared to social 
service charities, environmental charities behave 
in signifi cantly different ways when it comes to 
fi nances. They get a lower fraction of their fund-
ing from government grants and a higher fraction 
of their funding from private donations. While the 
evidence presented here shows a signifi cant relation-
ship between government and private funding of 
social service charities, no such relationship is found 
for environmental charities. Since environmental 
charities behave so much differently than other types 
of charities, it is errant to extrapolate results found 
from other charities to environmental charities.
The results for environmental charities are insig-
nifi cant. Though there are fewer observations from 
environmental charities than from social service 
charities, there are still tens of thousands, so small 
sample size is not likely to be a problem.11 The data 
from environmental organizations may contain 
more measurement error, especially as these chari-
ties tend to be smaller in terms of total revenues 
and younger. For both reasons, these charities may 
be less knowledgeable about the reporting require-
ments for the IRS forms. Another reason for the 
insignifi cant results for environmental charities 
may be that by looking only at data from charities, 
I am unable to capture any other types of crowding 
out behavior that may be unrelated to the charities. 
For example, in response to an increase in govern-
ment grants to environmental charities, individuals 
may not alter their contributions to charities, but 
instead alter their level of volunteering or recy-
cling.12 Similarly, governments may respond to an 
increase in private donations by decreasing funding 
to the EPA or other environmental activities besides 
the particular charity affected. This would bias 
downward my estimates of crowding out.
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According to White House audits, the total 
amount of federal grants to environmental chari-
ties in 2004 was $143 million, whereas the 2005 
EPA budget totaled $7.8 billion. Much of the EPA’s 
spending went to grants paid to states and tribal 
governments, which may in turn have used that 
federal money to pay grants to environmental chari-
ties. But it is clear that at least some and perhaps a 
large fraction of the money that government uses to 
provide environmental public goods are provided 
in other ways besides grants to charities. How this 
effect may bias the results is unclear. If grants to 
charities are a constant fraction of government 
spending on public goods, then no bias exists, 
since the increase that I see in the data in govern-
ment grants to charities corresponds to an increase 
in actual government provision of public goods. 
However, if the government substitutes nonprofi t 
grants for other spending on public goods (so that 
when I see an increase in grants in the data, the 
actual government provision of public goods may 
have stayed constant or decreased), then the results 
may be biased. If this effect is more pronounced for 
environmental public goods, this may explain the 
lack of signifi cant results for those charities.
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Notes
 1 A list of such organizations is available at http://www.
epa.gov/airmarkt/trading/buying.html#groups. 
 2 Aldy and Stavins (2007) discuss a number of policy op-
tions for international frameworks addressing climate 
change beyond the Kyoto period.
 3 http://nccs.urban.org. 
 4 Specifi cally, environmental charities include those 
involved in pollution control and abatement; conserva-
tion and development of natural resources; control or 
elimination of hazardous or toxic substances including 
pesticides; solid waste management; urban beautifi ca-
tion and open spaces development; environmental 
education and outdoor survival; and botanical gardens 
and horticultural societies. Animal-related charities 
include organizations that develop and maintain fi sh-
eries resources and wildlife habitats to preserve and 
protect endangered species and other wildlife; humane 
societies; veterinary services; aquariums; and zoos.
 5 These are the organizations listed under the 1-digit 
NTEE codes of I, J, K, L, P, and S. This is the same set 
of codes used by Andreoni and Payne (2003) for their 
set of social service organizations. Here, I separate 
environmental charities from the rest of the group. 
Andreoni and Payne (2003) also exclude some orga-
nizations that they describe as not directly providing 
services, while I include all 501(c)(3) organizations in 
those categories (see their fn. 15).
 6 The fi rst category is direct public support, which is the 
main category of donations from individuals. Second is 
indirect public support, comprised mainly of donations 
given to the charities collected by federated fundraising 
agencies, such as the United Way. The next category 
is government grants, which includes monies from 
federal, state, and local governments. Program ser-
vice revenue is the money collected from the services 
that form the organizations exemption from tax. For 
example, a hospital would count as program service 
revenue all of its charges from medical services or 
room charges. Dues collected includes only the amount 
of dues received that are not contributions, for example 
the dues that go towards a subscription to a newsletter 
or some other benefi t. Investment income includes 
dividends and interest on savings and cash accounts; 
rents and sales include net revenue from rents and 
from sales of securities, inventory, or other assets. 
Finally, the last category includes all other revenue, 
including from special events such as dinners, raffl es, 
or door-to-door sales of merchandise. Revenues are 
disaggregated into these categories only for charities 
which fi le Form 990, not Form 990-EZ. Eighty-seven 
percent of social service charities do so, as do 75 
percent of environmental charities. Nonprofi ts with 
income less than $100,000 and total assets less than 
$250,000 can fi le Form 990-EZ, though they may fi le 
Form 990 if they prefer.
 7 The dip in private donations to environmental charities 
approximately coincides with the recession in the early 
2000s. The fact that a similar dip is not visible in private 
donations to social service charities may indicate that 
donations to environmental charities are more income 
elastic than donations to social service charities.
 8 Khanna and Sandler (2000), Andreoni and Payne 
(2003), and Payne (1998) use similar instruments.
 9 See www.nber.org/~taxsim.
10 Hendrickson (2005).
11 Also, when disaggregating categories of charities, 
several categories of social service charities which 
contain fewer observations than the environmental 
charity data set still provide signifi cant consistent 
regression results.
12 Simmons and Emanuele (2004) fi nd that government 
grants crowd out donations of both money and time.
100TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION
259
References
Andreoni, James. 
  Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to 
 Charity and Ricardian Equivalence. Journal of 
 Political Economy 97 (December 1989): 1447-
 1458.
  Towards a Theory of Charitable Fund-Raising. 
 Journal of Political Economy 106 (December 
 1998): 1186-1213.
Andreoni, James, and Abigail Payne. Do Government 
Grants to Private Charities Crowd Out Giving or 
Fund-Raising? American Economic Review 93 (June 
2003): 792-812.
Aldy, Joseph, and Robert Stavins, eds. Architectures for 
Agreement: Addressing Global Climate Change in the 
Post-Kyoto World. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007.
Hendrickson, Laura. Coverage of the Endangered Species 
Act in Four Major Newspapers. Natural Resources 
Journal 45 (Winter 2005): 135-168.
Heutel, Garth. Crowding In and Crowding Out of Private 
Donations and Government Grants. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University, 2007. Working Paper.
Khanna, Jyoti and Todd Sandler. Partners in Giving: The 
Crowding-In Effects of UK Government Grants. 
European Economic Review 44 (August 2000): 
1543-1556.
Kingma, Bruce. An Accurate Measurement of the Crowd-
Out Effect, Income Effect, and Price Effect for Chari-
table Contributions. Journal of Political Economy 97 
(October 1989): 1197-1207.
List, John and David Lucking-Reiley. The Effects of 
Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: 
Experimental Evidence from a University Capital 
Campaign. Journal of Political Economy 110 (Febru-
ary 2002): 215-233.
Payne, Abigail. 
  Does the Government Crowd-Out Private Donations? 
 New Evidence from a Sample of Non-profi t Firms. 
 Journal of Public Economics 69 (September 
 1998): 323-45.
  Measuring the Effect of Federal Research Funding 
 on Private Donations at Research Universities: Is 
 Federal Research Funding More than a Substitute 
 for Private Donations? International Tax and 
 Public Finance 8 (November 2001): 731-751.
Roberts, Russell. A Positive Model of Private Charity 
and Public Transfers. Journal of Political Economy 
92 (February 1984): 136-148.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan. Do Government Grants to 
Charity Reduce Private Donations? In Susan Rose-
Ackerman, ed. The Economics of Nonprofi t Institu-
tions: Studies in Structure and Policy (Yale Studies 
on Nonprofi t Organizations Series). New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 313-
329.
Simmons, Walter and Rosemarie Emanuele. Does Gov-
ernment Spending Crowd Out Donations of Time 
and Money? Public Finance Review 32 (September 
2004): 498-511.
Urban Institute. National Center on Charitable Statistics. 
Washington, D.C. http://nccs.urban.org
Warr, Peter. Pareto Optimal Redistribution and Private 
Charity. Journal of Public Economics 19 (October 
1982): 131-138.
